Zhaotian Luo is a formal theorist with a broad interest in the political economy of power and institutions. He specializes in developing and applying game theoretic models to explain the foundation, performance, evolution, and failure of various political institutions as equilibrium outcomes emerging from the strategic interaction among political actors. His current research centers around the dynamics of political power and institutions, including democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation.
Recent Research / Recent Publications
“Why are the Fastest Growing Countries Autocracies?,” Journal of Politics, 81(2), 663-669, 2019 (with Adam Przeworski).
“Strategies of Election Rigging: Tradeoffs, Determinants, and Consequences,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 13(1), 1-28, 2018 (with Arturas Rozenas).
“The Election Monitor’s Curse,” American Journal of Political Science, 62(1), 148-160, 2018 (with Arturas Rozenas).